AUGMENTED JUSTICE: WHAT ROLE CAN AI PLAY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING?

SAMIR MERABET

AUGMENTED JUSTICE: WHAT ROLE CAN AI PLAY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING?

Samir MERABET
University of Lyon III

Abstract

Artificial intelligence is permeating all sectors of activity, and the law is no exception. While the digitalization of justice has unfolded gradually over the past few years, the rapid democratization of artificial intelligence tools—particularly following the deployment of ChatGPT in December 2022—has triggered a swift transformation of judicial practices, without allowing the legal framework sufficient time to adapt. Lawyers and judges now rely daily on artificial intelligence systems that are progressively reshaping judicial practice and, by extension, the law itself. Understanding this phenomenon requires, first, identifying the various uses of AI in judicial matters, and second, examining the applicable legal rules. This research highlights the shortcomings of the current legal framework, which call for the establishment of new rules capable of addressing the consequences of artificial intelligence on the judicial system, with the dual objective of safeguarding the rights of litigants and, more broadly, preserving the integrity of the legal system itself.

Keywords

ChatGPT, Judicial Decision-Making, Algorithmic Governance, Augmented Justice, Judicial Independence, Rule of Law

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of giving justice a mathematical foundation is not new. From Plato (Platon, 2013, pp. 39–40) to Condorcet (Condorcet, 1985, p. 432) , Leibniz (Leibniz, 1845, p. 382) and Laplace (de Laplace, 1820, p. 457), many thinkers have considered how to model legal reasoning. The subject seemed to have almost fallen into disuse, but has come back into the spotlight in recent years (Catala, 1998; Supiot, 2015), mainly because of technical advances, particularly in artificial intelligence. However, the focus no longer seems to be on the ability of computer systems to model legal reasoning, but rather on the practical applications of such systems. Progress has been so great that we could almost skip the feasibility stage and go straight to the question of whether it is appropriate. A large number of digital services for the legal market have emerged, in particular on the initiative of *legaltech*, whether for drafting deeds or devising the best litigation strategy. The legal profession is not immune to this trend, and the idea of the digitisation of justice is gradually taking hold (Godefroy et al., 2019), thanks in particular to artificial intelligence.

The digitization of the justice system is not new and did not wait for artificial intelligence. For example, since the covid 19 health crisis, we have been familiar with videoconferencing hearings and dematerialized procedures. Nevertheless, we have the intuition here that the use of artificial intelligence gives rise to very specific difficulties that require particular vigilance. Because behind the use of AI, it's not just the parties to the proceedings that are concerned, it's the law as a whole.

Here, as elsewhere, technology has preceded the law. Practitioners seized on artificial intelligence tools even before the public authorities considered regulating them. It was generative artificial intelligence systems in particular that caught the authorities off guard, as soon as ChatGPT went live. The phenomenon continues to grow, and all legal systems are gradually attempting to respond to the legitimate concerns raised by these tools.

As is often the case, there is an ambivalence here, between, on the one hand, the interest in using artificial intelligence to improve the functioning of the justice system and, on the other hand, the desire to protect litigants from the dangers posed by this technology. The dangers here are twofold. Firstly, in the short term, there are particular risks for litigants themselves, whose rights could be altered by the use of such systems. Secondly, from a systemic point of view, there are far greater risks for the justice system itself. By extension, it is the essence of the law itself that is at stake, and, more generally, the rule of law.

The easy way out might be to simply reject the use of artificial intelligence systems in judicial matters. It would be a form of obscurantism to refuse to take advantage of the benefits that technology can bring. Above all, the judicial institution often lacks the resources. In France,

Doyen Catala stated back in 1978 that, and I quote, "these days, a justice system overburdened with work would welcome more readily than in the past any help that would relieve its burden, even if it were computerized". This observation made in 1998 is now proving to be almost prophetic. In practice, we are already seeing professionals, lawyers and judges, using generative AI tools. It is undoubtedly preferable to regulate these tools rather than ban them outright, especially if we are unable to guarantee the effectiveness of such a ban.

There are now many concerns in practice. I have had the opportunity to talk to lawyers who have told me that judges use ChatGPT to draw up summaries of the facts in their decisions, or to summarize the arguments put forward in their submissions. On the other hand, some judges have told me that they are afraid of being faced with ever-lengthening submissions from lawyers, precisely because they would be generated in part by AI systems. It is certain that this is already a reality, on all sides of the judicial system.

The objective now is therefore first to determine the potential applications of AI systems in judicial matters (I) in order to identify those that can be envisaged and those that should be excluded. Next, it is still necessary to ensure that these systems are properly supervised to protect the judiciary from the various risks identified (II).

2. FROM DECISION SUPPORT TOOLS TO AUTOMATED JUDGES: A TYPOLOGY OF AI USES

The difficulty with generative AI systems lies in the diversity of uses to which they give rise. A single system can be used for a variety of purposes, including systems that are accessible to the general public such as ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity and Mistral.

One example illustrates the diversity of potential applications: imagine a magistrate who receives a file from the parties. He begins by submitting each party's written submissions to a general AI system to obtain a summary of the facts and legal arguments put forward by each party. Then, based on this, he is able to target the legal issues he needs to decide and will use both a general AI system and a search system proposed by a legal editor and specially trained with legal data such as case law, statute law and doctrine. Finally, once he has been able to identify the applicable rules and obtain analyses of them, he will write his decision, and to do this he will partly rely on the system, particularly for the summary of the facts, which can be a very tedious stage.

In France, the justice system is currently considering these issues (Godefroy et al., 2019). Last February, the Ministry of Justice announced that it had begun "exploratory work on the use of artificial intelligence to modernise the public justice service". At this stage, a number of applications are being considered: transcribing interviews, research assistance, interpreting,

translating and summarising case files. Clearly, not all of these applications entail the same risks, with some relating solely to the administration of justice while others are already encroaching on the judicial function itself. The French Court of Cassation has published a report on its potential uses of artificial intelligence (Préparer La Cour de Cassation de Demain, Cour de Cassation et Intelligence Artificielle, 2025). In it, the Court sets out a number of possible uses: exploiting the parties' written submissions, assisting with research and exploiting databases, filtering appeals, identifying procedural flaws and assisting with decision-making. The report is in favour of certain uses and categorically excludes others, such as decision support.

Let's try to put all this in order by establishing a nomenclature of potential applications, to better determine the risk specific to each. We propose to consider the diversity of the systems involved through the legal function of judicial artificial intelligence systems: to know (A) and to judge (B).

2.1. Knowing the law

Artificial intelligence systems can be used to make it easier to understand both the law and the facts.

Firstly, artificial intelligence can make it easier to understand the facts. Systems can be used to summarize documents, summarize the parties' submissions, summarize the facts of a case, etc. In some complex proceedings, there may be hundreds of pages of submissions and exhibits. There is no doubt that the use of artificial intelligence can save a considerable amount of time.

Secondly, the use of artificial intelligence also makes it possible to find out the law applicable to the dispute. This means that a judge can interrogate an AI system to find out the state of the law on a given issue. To accomplish this task, it is possible to use general services available to the general public, such as ChatGPT or Mistral. It is also possible to use more specific tools offered for legal matters. In France, for example, the main legal publishers now offer this type of system, the performance of which varies according to the complexity of the question and the legal subject concerned. Here again, we might hope that artificial intelligence can be used to facilitate access to the law. In France, some courts are made up of lay magistrates who are not lawyers. This is the case with the Conseil des prud'homme (industrial tribunal), where the judges are representatives of employees and employers, and the Tribunal de commerce (commercial court), which is made up of company directors. In the case of technical disputes, these lay judges could find useful assistance in an AI system that would identify and explain the applicable legal rules or relevant case law.

The recent case before the Colombian Constitutional Court in the summer of 2024 provides a perfect illustration of one such use of artificial intelligence (*Blanca v. EPS*, 2024). The case concerned a decision handed down by the Circuit Court on 30 January 2023, in a dispute relating to the provision of care for a child with an autistic disorder. Colombian legislation provided for free care for children with disabilities. It was still necessary to determine whether the facts of the case corresponded to the letter of the law. The judges put a number of fundamental questions to ChatGPT: "Are autistic children exempt from the moderating co-payments for their therapies?"; "Does requiring moderating co-payments in these cases constitute a barrier to access to care?"; "Has the case law of the Constitutional Court given favourable decisions in similar cases? This shows just how approximate the answers are. The constitutional judges are going to carry out several experiments by questioning ChatGPT with similar questions, but modifying the prompt, and identify that this has a significant impact on the answers proposed. It should be noted at this stage that the trial judges who used ChatGPT state that they in no way reproduced the answers formulated by the AI, but merely used it as a tool to facilitate their research into the law applicable to the case. On the face of it, we can be reassured about the limited use of the AI system in question. However, what will happen if the decision is taken by the judges themselves, but on the basis of incorrect legal data? We can already see that distinguishing between the functions of knowledge of the law and decision making can be artificial. These are two theoretically distinct functions, and it is easy to slip from one to the other.

2. 2. Telling the law

Depending on how we understand the law, we might think that legal decisions follow a mathematical logic and are therefore predictable. For example, a properly trained artificial intelligence system could predict the outcome of a dispute or changes in case law (Aletras et al., 2016; Katz et al., 2017). This is known as "predictive justice" (Garapon, 2017, p. 49). Taken to its extreme, this logic could lead one to believe that if artificial intelligence can predict the outcome of a dispute, it can also decide it itself. Thus, at the very pinnacle of judicial artificial intelligence systems, we would find devices designed to make decisions in place of judges.

The purpose of these artificial intelligence systems would then no longer be to inform and support the decision-maker, but to be entrusted with the decision itself. This is the most worrying scenario, but also the least likely. The hypothesis of a totally autonomous justice system, with no human intervention, is undoubtedly a science fiction scenario. So systems with full decision-making powers are almost non-existent. The only ones that do exist are the automatic speed cameras used to detect traffic offences and to issue fines (Bourcier, 2011, pp. 51–52). These machines are old and are not based on artificial intelligence systems. Their

operation is relatively limited: they detect the speed of a vehicle and establish that it was speeding. There is no assessment of the facts or the rule of law, which is applied automatically. Beyond such specific cases where the judge only has related jurisdiction (Mehl, 1992), it seems unlikely that such decision-making systems will be used. However, as AI models become more sophisticated, this prospect is becoming increasingly likely.

So what role can AI play in the decision-making process (Relling, 2019, pp. 221)? There are several potential applications. Experiments have already been carried out in France, on certain contentious cases, without ever actually being implemented by the courts. However, taking a look at them will enable us to see how AI tools could be used.

The first French example is the *Datajust* system. This software was designed for use in personal injury compensation cases. On 27 March 2020, the Ministry of Justice issued a decree announcing the creation of an automated personal data processing system for personal injury cases (Decree no. 2020-356 of 27 March 2020 creating an automated personal data processing system called 'DataJust' Bensamoun & Douville, 2020, p. 907; Coulon, n.d., p. 5; Merabet, 2020, pp. 22). The decree specified the functions that could be assigned to this system, including drawing up "an indicative benchmark for compensation for personal injury", "providing information to the parties and assistance in assessing the amount of compensation to which victims may be entitled in order to promote an amicable settlement of disputes", and providing information to judges "called upon to rule on claims for compensation for personal injury". "DataJust" is intended to be a tool for judges, victims and their counsel, designed to provide better information and, consequently, more effective compensation for personal injury. In the short term, digital technology could undoubtedly be of benefit, by reducing judicial uncertainty in favour of greater predictability, thereby enhancing legal certainty. However, the prospect of immediate and uncertain benefits should not conceal the more profound effects that 'DataJust' is likely to have in the medium and long term. In concrete terms, this decision support system was intended to formulate compensation suggestions for victims. For this reason, it provoked indignant reactions from all the parties involved: magistrates' unions, the legal profession and victims' defence associations. In the end, the French government abandoned this initiative (Merabet, 2022, Chapters 4, § 2).

The reluctance of French institutions contrasts with the important role that artificial intelligence has played for several years in the USA, particularly in criminal litigation. Algorithms are used in the *pretrial justice department* to assess the risk of a defendant not appearing for trial. The software then assigns the defendant a score ranging from 1 to 10, with the maximum score representing the highest risk of non-appearance. This score is sent to the magistrate responsible for deciding whether to place the person on remand and, if so, the

amount of bail. Even more surprisingly, such algorithms are used to determine the nature and quantum of sentences handed down by the courts by assigning the defendant a score determined by his risk of re-offending. What is at stake here is the criteria taken into account by the algorithm and the data made available to it. While the secrecy surrounding these technologies makes access to this information difficult, several associations that have analysed the decisions handed down by courts using this software have revealed numerous instances of discrimination committed by the algorithm. The investigative website Probublica (Angwin et al.) consulted more than 10,000 cases in which the COMPAS software had been used. This study showed that the algorithm gave a much higher risk of re-offending to African-Americans than to white people, even though the offences and profiles involved were similar. Discrimination may be intentional and implemented by the author of the algorithm itself. However, it is often fortuitous, as researchers have shown that the cognitive biases of human beings can be passed on to machines. The predictive software used in the legal field is based on the algorithm's study of previous case law. So if judges discriminate in certain ways in their rulings and these rulings subsequently serve as a model for artificial intelligence, it is likely that these discriminations will be reproduced.

In these various cases, it can be seen that it is a question of making an assessment of the facts. If such devices are used, they will not constrain the judge, who remains free to trust or not the suggestions made to him by the AI. However, we can be wary insofar as these suggestions are likely to have a decisive influence on the judge's decision. There is a natural bias in trusting the technical and scientific authority of an assessment made by an AI system on the basis of a large amount of data. What is thought of only as an aid to decision-making can then insidiously become a decision. This is why we need to be very cautious about the use of such a system. The different categories of applications envisaged are not watertight, and we can very quickly move from one to another. This situation means that we need to be vigilant in providing safeguards in all situations, even for uses that may seem the least engaging, insofar as they can produce significant effects.

3. FROM THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK TO FUTURE REGULATIONS: BUILDING GOVERNANCE FOR JUDICIAL AI

The supervision of AI systems in judicial matters exposes us to classic difficulties in the field of new technologies: innovations and their uses precede the rule of law itself. This is why, more often than not, we must first rely on pre-existing standard-setting tools to provide an immediate response to the risks identified and then, in a second phase, consider new rules of law specially designed to apply to them. This is the method we are going to consider here, starting with the pre-existing rules and moving on to those that could be adopted.

3.1. De lege lata

In the current state of positive law, without any reforms even being necessary, we can identify several legal bases capable of providing a framework for AI systems used in judicial matters.

Firstly, we can rely on the regulation on artificial intelligence adopted by the European Union in June 2024. This text applies to high-risk AI systems. Annex 3 of the Regulation describes them as "AI systems intended to be used by or on behalf of a judicial authority to assist it in searching for and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts, or to be used in a similar manner in the context of alternative dispute resolution". In this regard, Recital 61 of the Regulation states that "The use of AI tools may support judicial decision-making or judicial independence, but should not replace them: the final decision must remain a human activity". This classification as a high-risk AI system will immediately make most of the Regulation's obligations applicable to the systems in question: transparency, obligation to provide information, security, human control, etc. This means that litigants will benefit from fairly ambitious protection.

Secondly, we can always count on the support of fundamental rights to protect litigants from abuses linked to the use of AI systems. This is precisely what the Colombian Constitutional Court did in the case mentioned earlier (*Blanca v. EPS*, 2024). To invalidate the decision handed down by the judges of first instance, the Colombian judges invoked article 29 of the Colombian Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. This right includes the principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, the rights of the defence, the *ne bis in idem* principle and the right to public proceedings within a reasonable time (§76). Certain manifestations of the right to a fair trial are more likely to be affected by the use of an artificial intelligence system. In the Court's view, this particularly concerns the right to a natural judge, understood as "an official having the legal capacity or competence to exercise jurisdiction in respect of a particular procedure" (§77), the right to reasons for decisions and the right to evidence (§81). Insofar as Article 29 of the Constitution is broadly similar to Article 6§1 of the ECHR, it might be thought that an equivalent solution could be found on our side of the Atlantic.

We can be reassured that rules already exist to limit the risks associated with the use of AI systems in judicial matters. However, because these foundations are not specifically designed for, they do not cover all the risks. This is why new principles specifically designed for this purpose need to be considered.

3.2. De lege feranda

The best solution would undoubtedly be to enshrine guiding principles for augmented trials, by which I mean those in which AI systems would be used. I propose to distinguish these principles into two categories: those applicable at the tool design stage and those applicable at the tool use stage. Because I'm running out of time, I'm going to mention them briefly, and will have the opportunity to go into them in greater depth in my written contribution, which will be published.

First, let's take a quick look at the principles applicable to the design of tools (Merabet, 2021, pp. 18–21). To ensure that the tools work properly, the public authorities cannot disregard the design of the tools, since flaws at the design stage will necessarily lead to problems. I propose to adopt four principles to address four concerns.

Firstly, the principle of sovereignty. According to Max Weber, the State has a monopoly on legitimate violence. But it is justice that dictates the exercise of this power. It is one of the main attributes of state sovereignty. Therefore, just as it is unthinkable for the State to delegate to a private company or another State the task of dispensing justice on its territory, it is also unthinkable for the tools used to dispense justice to be delegated. The principle of sovereignty dictates that the State should equip itself with its own artificial intelligence tools in judicial matters and design them itself without delegating this task to private sector companies. Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity. AI is certainly of interest for certain types of litigation. This is particularly the case for mass litigation, as in consumer law, or fairly objective litigation such as compensation litigation. On the other hand, some legal systems are based on rules of law that are far too subjective to be properly modelled. For example, French law relies heavily on standards, still referred to as "indeterminate notions". This is the case, for example, with the duty of good faith in contractual matters and the behaviour of a "bon père de famille" ("good father of the family"). The principle of subsidiarity means that AI systems should only be deployed in cases where the use of this technology would guarantee better justice. This must lead to a mapping of disputes in order to assess which can be dealt with by AI and which must remain the preserve of a totally human justice system. Thirdly, a principle of speciality. General-purpose AI systems are undoubtedly fashionable. However, the specific nature of legal matters does not sit well with such a degree of abstraction. The effectiveness and security of systems used in legal matters presupposes that the systems are specifically designed to apply to a given type of litigation, based on quality data. This leads us to be wary of general tools and to prefer systems that are specifically designed for a particular type of litigation.

Finally, let's look at the principles applicable to the use of tools. This time, we are talking about much more traditional principles that are actually common to the use of AI systems, regardless of the sector in which they are used. Firstly, the principle of transparency must be ensured. On the one hand, this presupposes that litigants who are exposed to this type of system are expressly informed. On the other hand, it presupposes that the parties to the dispute in which an AI system is used can have access to decisive information concerning the algorithms used and the data, whether training data or data submitted to the systems. Secondly, it is necessary to impose a principle of competence, which requires that the people brought in to mobilise the artificial intelligence tools have both the legal knowledge relating to the litigation in question, and the technical knowledge to understand the tool used. This is the only way to ensure that the decision taken remains a human decision and not simply the automatic application of an artificial intelligence suggestion. Otherwise, there is a risk that a judge who does not have sufficient skills and knowledge will prefer to defer to the authority of the system, which is perceived as having in-depth knowledge and expertise. Thirdly, if this type of system were to be used in the courts, a principle of intelligibility would also need to be enshrined to ensure that litigants fully understand the decision they are faced with and that there is no doubt or suspicion regarding the decision handed down. This principle of intelligibility presupposes a stronger statement of reasons for decisions when an AI system is used, so that ultimately, litigants always perceive the decision as a human decision. It is only under these conditions that court decisions are likely to be accepted by litigants and that the feeling of justice is not diluted by the modernisation of the judicial institution. In one way or another, the regulation on artificial intelligence now makes it possible to ensure all of these principles.

4. CONCLUSION

What risks does artificial intelligence pose for the justice system? There are many, some of which are fairly standard in the field of AI, while others are more specific to the subject that interests us. There are obviously risks of malfunction, of mistakes being made, particularly because of the hallucinations of artificial intelligence. There are also risks of bias, which could lead to discrimination of all kinds. This will be particularly the case if the datasets used are not of good quality and are not sufficiently representative. In this respect, the Colombian Constitutional Court, in the ruling referred to above, noted that ChatGPT was an American system, trained with data that was not sufficiently adapted to the Colombian population.

In addition to these classic risks, there are others that are more specific. There is a risk to the balance of power, as conceptualised by Montesquieu. The independence of the judiciary could be undermined depending on the origin of the systems used by judges. Whoever designs the tool necessarily has a decisive influence on how it works. If AI systems are designed by the

executive, for example the Ministry of Justice, there is a risk that judges will be deprived of some of their decision-making power in favour of the executive. There is also a risk of the "factualisation of law". Indeed, if the systems generate proposed solutions based on case law, it is possible that this could lead to case law playing a greater role in the legal syllogism, to the detriment of the law. In this way, the decision would not be based on a deductive logic, based on an abstract law, but rather on an inductive logic, based on the specific application of the law by case law. In a system of continental law such as French law, the legal system is based primarily on the law. Gradually, this can lead to a discreet change in the very spirit of a legal system. It is understandable here that the subject requires a comparative law approach. Indeed, the introduction of AI systems into the legal system may have different effects in a civil law system and a common law system.

In the end, we realise that the subject goes far beyond the sole community of judges and lawyers. Behind judicial AI, the rule of law is at stake. It is also a question of the confidence of litigants in the judicial institution. More generally, it is the acceptability of legal decisions, which is the foundation of the State, that is at stake. All in all, we need to be particularly vigilant to ensure that the justice system in particular and the law as a whole are not distorted by artificial intelligence.

REFERENCES

Aletras, N., Tsarapatsanis, D., Preoţiuc-Pietro, D., & Lampos, V. (2016). Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing perspective. *PeerJ Computer Science*, *2*.

Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (n.d.). *Machine Bias*. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

Bensamoun, A., & Douville, T. (2020). DataJust, une contribution à la transformation numérique de la justice. *JCP G*, 907–910.

Blanca v. EPS, No. T-323/24 (Corte constitucional de Colombia 2 August 2024).

Catala, P. (1998). *Le droit à l'épreuve du numérique*. Presses universitaires de France (PUF).

Condorcet, M.-J.-A. (1985). Mémoire sur le calcul des probabilités (1786). In B. Bru & P. Crépel (Eds), *Arithmétique politique: Textes rares ou inédits (1767-1789)*. INED-PUF.

Coulon, C. (n.d.). Datajust, ou l'outil référentiel numérique des préjudices corporels: Aussitôt né, aussitôt enterré? *Rev. Resp Civile et Assurrance*, *5*.

de Laplace, P.-S. (1820). *Théorie analytique des probabilités* (3rd edn). Coursier.

Garapon, A. (2017). Les enjeux de la justice prédictive. *La Semaine Juridique – Édition Générale*, *1–2*, 47–52.

Godefroy, L., Lebaron, F., & Lévy-Vehel, J. (2019). *Comment le numérique transforme le droit et la justice vers de nouveaux usages et un bouleversement de la prise de décision* (Mission de Recherche Droit et Justice).

Katz, D. M., Bommarito, 2nd Michael J., & Blackman, J. (2017). A general approach for predicting the behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States. *PLOS ONE*, *12*(4).

Leibniz, G. W. (1845). Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. In M.-A. Jacques (Ed.), *Oeuvres de Leibniz*. Charpentier.

Mehl, L. (1992). À quelle condition une décision juridictionnelle, administrative ou privée, peut-elle être totalement ou partiellement automatisée. *Informatique Juridique et Droit de l'Informatique*, *12*, 26–33.

Merabet, S. (2020). « DataJust » et l'effet papillon. À propos du décret du 27 mars 2020. *Revue pratique de la prospective et de l'innovation*, *2*.

Merabet, S. (2021). Hommage posthume à l'abandon de DataJust: Des principes directeurs de la justice numérique. *Revue Prospective de l'innovation*, *1*.

Merabet, S. (2022). Hommage posthume à l'abandon de DataJust: Des principes directeurs de la justice numérique. *Revue Pratique de La Prospective et de l'innovation*, *1*.

Platon. (2013). *Phédon*. Culture commune.

Préparer la Cour de cassation de demain, Cour de cassation et intelligence artificielle. (2025). Cour de cassation.

Relling, D. (2019). Quelle place pour l'intelligence artificielle dans le processus de décision d'un juge? *Les Cahier de La Justice*, *2*.

Supiot, A. (2015). *La Gouvernance par les nombres*. FAYARD.

ABOUT AUTHOR

Prof. Dr. Samir MERABET | University of Lyon III |
samir.merabet[at]univ-lyon3.fr | ORCID: 0009-0002-3058-058X

Samir Merabet is a Professor of Private Law and Criminal Science at the University of Lyon III. He defended his doctoral dissertation, entitled "Towards a Law of Artificial Intelligence," in 2018. Since then, the core of his research has focused on digital law in general, and on the legal framework of artificial intelligence in particular. His work notably examines the implications of artificial intelligence in civil law, business law, and intellectual property law. His primary field of inquiry concerns the use of artificial intelligence by legal professionals—lawyers and judges alike—and the impact that such use may have on law and the administration of justice.